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Protecting Stateless Refugees
in the United States
David Baluarte

Miliyon is a stateless, failed asylum seeker residing in the United States. He
initially sought refugee protection after he fled Ethiopia, where he had faced
serious abuse because of his Eritrean ethnicity. Immigration authorities denied
him asylum after concluding that the Ethiopian government’s deportation of his
Eritrean father, the seizure of his family’s land and business, and the detention
and torture of Miliyon himself constituted a property dispute not protected
under U.S. refugee law. Miliyon fought this denial of protection over the next
decade through various appeals processes but ultimately failed. At that point,
he applied for a passport at the Ethiopian embassy in Washington, D.C. and
resigned himself to return home and face whatever fate awaited him. Consular
officials, however, refused to issue him a passport. Despite never having set foot
in Eritrea or having any other connection to the country, Miliyon was told that
he was Eritrean, not Ethiopian. He was informed that he had no right to return
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to Ethiopia, his country of birth and the only place he had ever lived. This led
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to declare
Miliyon stateless. As a victim of discriminatory denationalization, Miliyon tried
to renew his application for refugee protection. Notwithstanding the fact that
Miliyon had endured this persecutory treatment, U.S. authorities once again
denied his claim.
Miliyon’s failure to secure refugee protection in the United States reveals a
series of deficiencies in U.S. asylum law and procedure as it applies to stateless
persons. These deficiencies are in part related to the incomplete incorporation
of international frameworks for the protection of refugees and stateless persons
by the United States. Specifically, while the United States implemented its
international refugee law obligations in the 1980 Refugee Act, it has neither
signed the subsequent international treaties for the protection of stateless persons nor enacted any domestic laws to fill this gap. As a result, U.S. law does
not provide a definition of statelessness, a procedure for the determination of
statelessness, or a framework for the protection of stateless persons. While U.S.
asylum protection is available to stateless persons, the gap in the law with regard
to statelessness leads many asylum adjudicators to misunderstand the unique
circumstances that contribute to the persecution of stateless refugees. Moreover,
stateless persons are subject to the same removal procedures as migrants with a
nationality, and they are ordered to be removed after an asylum denial despite
the fact that they have nowhere else in the world to go.
This article proposes a more complete and nuanced consideration of statelessness in asylum adjudication procedures in the United States and the possibility
of reopening previously denied asylum claims like Miliyon’s for this purpose.
The article proceeds in four parts, beginning with a discussion of statelessness
in the United States. Next, the article describes the international protection
frameworks for both refugees and stateless persons and identifies important
points of intersection between these frameworks. Then the article argues that
discriminatory denationalization that renders a person stateless triggers refugee
protection, thereby making victims of such deprivation eligible for asylum in
the United States. The article concludes that stateless refugees like Miliyon
should be able to reopen their previously denied asylum claims to make these
arguments and pursue protection.
Statelessness in the United States
A stateless person is one who is not a national of any country under the
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operation of its laws.1 While this is an individualized legal determination that
can be technical in nature, the lived experience of a stateless person is not at all
a technical matter. Untethered from the international order of nation-states,
stateless persons have no home anywhere in the world. This is particularly
important to understand as the tenor of global discourse about unauthorized
migration has become harsh and unsympathetic.
As might be expected, stateless persons without authorization to reside in
the United States live in the shadows, avoiding contact with the criminal justice
system and immigration authorities. If stateless migrants like Miliyon do come
into contact with the immigration system, they are treated in the same manner
as any other migrant; if they are found removable, they are mandatorily detained.
Because they cannot actually be removed from As might be expected, stateless persons
the country, as no other without authorization to reside in the
nation will accept them,
United States live in the shadows, avoidthey may face prolonged
detention, but they will ing contact with the criminal justice
eventually be released system and immigration authorities.
to a life on parole. Separated permanently from their families abroad, they live their lives under the
constant scrutiny of immigration officials with the discretion to grant or deny
their requests to work legally, and the authority to re-detain them.2 The stateless
legal limbo in the United States is a lonely and precarious existence.
The Center for Migration Studies (CMS), a nonpartisan, New York-based
think tank, recently conducted a study that estimated and profiled the population
of people in the United States who may be stateless, with eye-opening results.3
CMS recognized at the outset that U.S. law does not define statelessness and
that the U.S. government does not make any specific effort to determine who is
stateless or count those who fall under this category. Through a rigorous mixed
method of quantitative and qualitative analysis, CMS developed a comprehensive
set of profiles of migrants who are potentially stateless, or potentially at risk of
statelessness, and provided an estimate of that population in the United States.
CMS intentionally qualified the terms “stateless” and “at risk of statelessness”
with the term potentially in order to capture all people of a national, ethnic, or
religious background who could be stateless. CMS then used large, governmentmaintained databases to estimate the population of people potentially of concern.
The contributions of this important work are at least threefold. First, the
comprehensive nature of the study, by first collecting the many profiles of global
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statelessness and then matching them with existing databases of foreign-born
persons in the United States, is quite stunning. With the increasing global awareness of statelessness in recent years, numerous marginalized ethnic and religious
groups are now understood to have precarious nationality rights. For example,
Syrian Kurds forced to flee the protracted conflict in Syria risk statelessness, as
do Bahamians of Haitian ancestry in the Caribbean nation just 50 miles off the
coast of Florida. While an exact count of the U.S. stateless population is impossible, matching these profiles with the U.S. foreign-born population provides
a much clearer sense of the likely contours of the stateless population in the
United States than has ever been possible before.
Second, using innovative statistical modeling, CMS was able to estimate
that there are approximately 218,000 foreign-born persons in the United States
who are potentially stateless or at risk of statelessness. While the actual number
of stateless persons in the United States is probably much lower than 218,000,
the study suggests that the population is likely larger than the previous UNHCR
estimate of just 4,000 stateless people. The people identified in the CMS study
live in all 50 states of the United States, and they represent every major region
of the world. Notably, more than half of the estimated population were identified in Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS) data, one
of the two principal data sources analyzed by CMS. This suggests that a large
portion of the U.S. stateless population are recognized refugees, which means
that they have immigration status and are on a path to gaining U.S. citizenship.
Finally, while most foreign-born people who are possibly stateless or at risk
of statelessness are refugees and protected under U.S. law, CMS discovered that
a substantial portion of the population does not appear in the WRAPS data and
may have no status in the United States. This population was identified though
an analysis of American Community Survey (ACS) data, collected annually by
the U.S. Census Bureau. Napkin math based on the CMS data analysis provides
that roughly 80,000 people who are potentially stateless or at risk of statelessness
appear in the ASC data set and do not appear in the WRAPS data set.4 This
suggests that about 40 percent of the U.S. stateless population is not protected
by refugee status and may be in need of international protection. This group is
of particular concern because it is most in need of legislative action to define
statelessness and create the protective framework that is currently absent. This
realization should prompt a sustained effort to pass such legislation.
Notably, a well-developed proposal for a stateless person protection mechanism has been included in every iteration of the Refugee Protection Act (RPA),
which Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) has introduced to the U.S. Congress nearly
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every legislative cycle since 2010.5 While the RPA has never garnered sufficient
support as a stand-alone bill to reach the floor of the Senate for a vote, it was
included in the bi-partisan Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013 (SB 744).6 The Senate passed SB 744 in
2013, but the legislation was never presented for a vote in the lower house of
Congress due to political opposition to progressive comprehensive immigration
reform. That is the closest that United States has ever come to passing a stateless
person protection mechanism into law.
While the harsh political landscape for immigrants in the United States
today makes the near-miss reform bill of 2013 seem utopian, the statelessness
provision nevertheless merits close consideration. The proposed mechanism
would have created a definition for “stateless person” to mirror the definition set
forth in the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons (Statelessness
Convention).7 It would have also granted a procedure for the determination of
statelessness to guide immigration authorities in identifying who is “not considered a national under the operation of the laws of any country.”8 Basic legal
protection and immigration status for individuals determined to be “stateless
person(s)”, would also have been provided by the proposed law. Specifically, upon
receiving stateless status, individuals would receive work authorization, become
eligible for travel documents, have the ability to become Lawful Permanent
Residents, and ultimately have the opportunity to apply for U.S. citizenship—a
permanent resolution to their stateless status.9 The proposed statelessness protection mechanism would potentially solve the situation of the vast majority of
stateless persons in the United States, who are currently unprotected.
That this statelessness protection mechanism is situated in a broader legislative proposal titled the Refugee Protection Act is no coincidence—it highlights
the important relationship, both legally and factually, between stateless persons
and refugees. The following section will elaborate on the important relationship
between these two categories of internationally protected peoples to set up a
discussion of how asylum protection can be maximized to encompass the stateless population in the United States.
Refugee Protection and Statelessness
Having no nationality under the laws of any country, stateless persons lack many
legal protections afforded to citizens. Refugees also lack a range of interrelated
human rights protections, facing unjustifiable abuse in their home countries.
The international community recognized statelessness and refugee status as two
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distinct forms of international protection after World War II amid efforts to
address a widespread problem of vulnerable people who lacked protection at the
national level. However, there was a meaningful overlap between those who were
considered stateless and those who were considered refugees in postwar Europe.
For example, Jewish people stripped of their nationality in Nazi Germany were
left stateless and were also considered refugees and qualified as such because
they had suffered physical brutality on account of their religion. It is important
to understand this historical overlap, inasmuch as it illuminates an overlap in
the legal protections that have developed over time. Moreover, this observation
about the overlap in legal protections serves as the foundation for the argument
advanced in this article that refugee protection in the form of asylum should be
interpreted to protect stateless persons in certain circumstances.
In the wake of World War II, the Conference of Plenipotentiaries charged
with designing the global refugee protection framework produced the 1951
Convention on the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention).10 Notably, as part
of that same charge, the Conference was instructed to devise a protocol for the
protection of stateless persons that would operate together with the Refugee
Convention. However, the protection of stateless persons was deferred at that
time and ultimately led to the promulgation of the 1954 Statelessness Convention, which mirrors the Refugee Convention in most of its substantive provisions.
These protection frameworks for refugees and stateless persons were refined and
amplified with the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention and the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, respectively. Notwithstanding
the relatively equal treatment at the level of international normative development, nations have generally understood the problem of refugee protection to
be more pressing than the challenges faced by stateless persons. Accordingly,
while the Refugee Convention has steadily accrued signatories over time and
become the default framework for asylum and refugee protection around the
world, the Statelessness Convention has struggled to garner broad ratification.
The UNHCR, which has a mandate to protect both refugees and stateless
persons under these respective convention frameworks, has worked intensely
in recent years to give greater visibility to global statelessness, with the ultimate
goal of eradication.11
Both the history of the Refugee and Statelessness Conventions as well as the
overall structure and specific provisions of those international treaties suggest that
the refugee protection framework was developed with statelessness protection in
mind. Indeed, the legal frameworks for refugees and stateless persons reinforce
this understanding. For example, the refugee definition provides two parallel
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paths to protection by stating that a refugee is a person who flees persecution in
her country of nationality or a non-national who flees persecution in her country
of last habitual residence. This second formulation, which protects refugees who
have “no nationality” and flee persecution in their country of last habitual residence, was clearly envisioned to provide refugee protection to stateless persons.
Naturally, stateless persons are not protected as refugees by merely establishing their statelessness; rather, they must demonstrate persecution on account
of one of the five protected characteristics (race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, or membership in a particular While U.S. courts have established that
social group) just like
statelessness in and of itself does not qualany national seeking
refugee protection. ify a person for refugee protection, they
It is the Stateless- have identified a variety of circumstances
ness Convention that in which stateless persons may suffer
envisions protection
harm that rises to the level of persecufor people based on
their stateless status tion on account of their stateless status.
alone, but the relatively sluggish adoption of this form of international protection should not
deter advocates for the protection of stateless persons from understanding their
plight as refugees. On the contrary, because refugee protection is often the only
means available for the protection of stateless persons available at the national
level, advocates must look to those procedures in order to ensure the human
rights of stateless persons.
The United States signed the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention,
and in 1980, the U.S. legislature passed the Refugee Act to codify refugee protection and bring the country into conformity with its international obligations.12
It was the 1980 Refugee Act that created both the system for resettlement of
refugees from abroad as well as the asylum system, which provides a path to
refugee protection for forced migrants present in the United States.13 While
U.S. courts have established that statelessness in and of itself does not qualify
a person for refugee protection, they have identified a variety of circumstances
in which stateless persons may suffer harm that rises to the level of persecution
on account of their stateless status. Most often, this is cast as persecution on
account of race or religion, as in the cases of Roma in Europe, Palestinians in
the Middle East, or even Ethiopians of Eritrean descent like Miliyon. The next
section explores the specific circumstances in which U.S. courts have extended
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International refugee law protects people who have been discriminatorily
deprived of their nationality and left stateless.14 In the United States, a series of
cases has emerged concerning whether similar protections should be afforded
domestically. Specifically, the Seventh, Sixth, and Ninth U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeal have posited that discriminatory denationalization that leaves someone
stateless may constitute persecution for the purposes of obtaining asylum
protection. However, such courts’ interpretations of asylum law are only binding
in the geographic regions in which they exercise jurisdiction, meaning their
decisions do not have a national effect. In each of these three cases, the Circuit
Court in question sent the case back to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),
the highest immigration appeals court within the Department of Justice, for
further consideration of this question. However, the BIA has so far declined to
issue a precedent decision on this matter, leaving many denationalized stateless
persons in the United States with no clear path to protection. A review of these
three cases gives a good sense of what is at stake.
The first court to take up this question was the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in Haile v. Gonzalez (Haile I), which involved consolidated
cases of two ethic Eritreans born in Ethiopia who sought asylum based on
Ethiopia’s arbitrary expulsion and denationalization of approximately 75,000
persons of Eritrean ethnicity.15 In 2005, the Seventh Circuit observed that the
same immigration judge in each case had denied asylum to the seeker based on
his understanding that a country has a sovereign right to grant or deny citizenship
as it sees fit, even in the case of discriminatory denationalization.16 In both cases,
the asylum seekers had escaped from Ethiopia without personally suffering any
physical mistreatment, but were effectively stripped of their Ethiopian citizenship and thus left stateless.17 The Seventh Circuit found it “arguable that such a
program of denationalization and deportation is in fact a particularly acute form
of persecution.”18 Because the court believed that the BIA should be the first
to address this legal question, it remanded the case for further consideration.19
While the BIA was reconsidering the questions remanded by the Seventh
Circuit in Haile I, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had occasion to review a similar case in 2009. In Mengstu v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit
reviewed the case of an ethnic Eritrean woman who fled Ethiopia during the
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massive campaign of forced expulsion and who had been denationalized during
her efforts to renew her identity documents.20 While the immigration judge
in that case also found that the asylum seeker had not suffered persecution,
the Ninth Circuit, “[l]ike the Seventh Circuit, [found] it ‘arguable that such
a program of denationalization and deportation is in fact a particularly acute
form of persecution,’ and … remand[ed] to the agency to answer this question
in the first instance.’”21
The very next year, Haile v. Holder (Haile II) returned to the Seventh Circuit after the BIA again denied one of the previous petitioners’ applications for
asylum.22 According to the Seventh Circuit, the BIA had denied the application
after finding that “while denationalization can be ‘a harbinger of persecution,’
the immigration judge ‘must look at the circumstances surrounding the loss of
nationality or citizenship and then, on an individual basis, determine whether
these circumstances rise to the level of persecution.’”23 The Seventh Circuit
found it troubling that the BIA had failed to provide any guidance on what such
“circumstances” might be and that, in support of its “denationalization plus”
formulation, it had given the example of Soviet citizens who were denationalized with the fall of the Soviet Union and then became Russian citizens. The
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the example of denationalization provided
by the BIA would not constitute persecution but distinguished the case before
it because the denationalization in question had resulted in statelessness.24 The
court found that “[i]f Ethiopia denationalized the petitioner because of his Eritrean ethnicity, it did so because of hostility to Eritreans,” and concluded that
“if to be made stateless is persecution, as we believe, … then to be deported to
the country that made you stateless and continues to consider you stateless is
to be subjected to persecution even if the country will allow you to remain and
will not bother you as long as you behave yourself.”25
While this decision of the Seventh Circuit provides a clear rule for that
jurisdiction, its exchange with the BIA on two separate occasions suggests that
this is not a rule that the BIA is applying throughout the United States. Moreover, without any published guidance from the BIA, immigration courts and
asylum officers are likely applying different rules in the variety of denationalization cases that come before them. Indeed, a case arising from a very different
country context led another U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal to seek clarification
from the BIA on this precise question.
In 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded a case
to the BIA to address the specific question of “whether ethnically motivated
citizenship revocation that results in statelessness is persecution” in a case in-
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volving ethnic Russians from Estonia.26 In that case, one of the petitioners lost
her Estonian nationality when Estonia gained independence from the Soviet
Union in 1991. The petitioner had been left stateless for a period of two years,
after which she regained Estonian nationality in exchange for her vote in an
election. The Sixth Circuit found that “[e]ven though the IJ did not believe that
[Petitioner] Stserba had shown any adverse consequences which arose or which
affected her as a consequence of her two years or less of lost citizenship, Stserba
may have suffered past persecution simply because she became stateless due to
her ethnicity.”27 The Sixth Circuit remanded the case for further consideration
from the BIA, and whatever the resolution of that individual case, no public
guidance has yet been published.
The disinclination of the BIA to exercise its authority to issue a rule of
national application complicates the efforts of stateless asylum seekers in the
United States who would otherwise be able to escape their legal limbo with
refugee protection. The case of Miliyon, whose plea for help after he was discriminatorily denationalized by the Ethiopian government and declared stateless by
the UNHCR has been ignored by the BIA, clearly evidences this disinclination.
Moreover, Miliyon faces an additional legal hurdle because he must demonstrate
not only that his discriminatory denationalization qualifies him for asylum, but
also that this change in circumstances is sufficiently significant to reopen his
long-denied claim for asylum.
Renewing a Claim for Asylum as a Stateless Person
When a stateless migrant is denied asylum by U.S. immigration authorities, the
would-be refugee is ordered to be removed from the country. The order is issued
despite the migrant’s
Somewhat counterintuitively, the statelessness, which in
willingness or ability of a country most cases means that
to readmit a migrant found remov- there is no country
in the world that will
able from the United States is not a accept the migrant’s
hinderance to a deportation decision. r e t u r n . S o m e w h a t
counterintuitively, the
willingness or ability of a country to readmit a migrant found removable from the
United States is not a hinderance to a deportation decision.28 This leads to some
stateless persons spending extended periods of time in immigration detention as
immigration officials engage in futile efforts to remove them to countries that
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will not accept them. Once released, the stateless migrant lives a life on parole
at the whim of immigration authorities.29 Similarly, when migrants discover
their statelessness after they have been ordered removed, as was the case with
Miliyon, they must meet a very difficult burden of proof to convince immigration
authorities to reconsider their asylum claim in light of this new evidence. In
order to renew a failed claim of asylum, a would-be refugee must convince the
BIA that circumstances have changed in the country of nationality in a way that
is material to the claim for protection. Commonly, these altered circumstances
can be a change in government or an internal armed conflict that affects the
socio-political situation in a manner that threatens a migrant seeking protection
in the United States. While this is usually how asylum seekers demonstrate
changed circumstances, there is nothing in the law that suggests that these are
the only kinds of changes that merit reopening an asylum case. There should
be little doubt that a deprivation of nationality that leaves someone stateless,
which is the sovereign act that literally excises a citizen from the body politic,
constitutes a change in circumstances in the country of nationality. Moreover,
for the reasons described by the Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits above, this is
a change in circumstances that goes to the heart of a claim for refugee protection.
While largely untested, this argument could provide stateless migrants with a
path to renewed consideration of their asylum claims.
At present, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is considering
Miliyon’s case; examining his argument that his discriminatory denationalization
and resulting statelessness constitute a change in circumstances in Ethiopia that
warrants reopening his claim for asylum. While this case is specifically about
Miliyon, it should be understood in the broader context of the BIA’s resistance
to an interpretation of U.S. law that would provide stateless migrants with a
clearer path to refugee protection. Miliyon is a member of the organization
“United Stateless,” the first affinity group whose membership is made up of
stateless migrants in the United States who have come together to expose the
injustices they endure and advocate for a more humane existence for stateless
persons.30 For this group, Miliyon’s case represents a hope that asylum could
provide a significant proportion of stateless migrants with a path out of their
legal limbo. Should the Fourth Circuit recognize the validity of Miliyon’s argument to reopen his case as well as his underlying claim for asylum, the United
States would take a meaningful step towards fulfilling its duty, as a member of
the global community, to eradicate statelessness. WA
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